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IMACHI NKWU : TRADE AND THE COMMONS
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. The conventional view is that an increase in the value of a natural resource
will lead private property to emerge. Many Igbo groups in Nigeria, however, curtailed
private rights over palm trees in response to the palm produce trade of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. I present a simple game between a property owner and a
potential thief in which an increase in the price of a natural resource makes it possible to
introduce regulated communal tenure. This makes the property owner better off, leaving
the thief as well off as under private property. I use this model along with colonial court
records to explain the political economy of property disputes in interwar Igboland.
“Palm cutting always cause palaver.”
Obuba of Ububa, Nkwo Udara Civil Suit 111/37
1. INTRODUCTION
Property rights matter for long-run economic growth, investment, and financial de-
velopment (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). For the majority
of poor farmers in Africa, rights over land and trees are central to their economic deci-
sions and to their well-being. In many African societies, group rights exist over these.
While there is debate over the efficiency of African tenure systems (Brasselle et al., 2002;
Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Feder and Noronha, 1987; Platteau, 1996), there is con-
siderable evidence that secure rights to land promote investment and efficiency, both
in Africa (Besley, 1995; Goldstein and Udry, 2008) and in other parts of the world (Feder
and Onchan, 1987; Shaban, 1987). Why, then, do group rights persist in Africa end else-
where? In this paper, I introduce a simple model to explain the adoption of communal
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palm harvesting (imachi nkwu) in response to commercialization of palm oil among
the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria.1
I argue that communal harvesting simplified the act of monitoring theft, lowering its
marginal cost relative to the cost of supervising theft from private palm groves. Thieves
needed only to be caught harvesting on the wrong day. Though property owners surren-
dered a share of the harvest under common property, rising palm oil prices increased
the incentive to steal, making monitoring more costly under private property and ac-
centuating the benefits of this arrangement. The key result of the model I present is
that, if the price of palm oil rises above a certain threshold, communal property will im-
prove the welfare of property owners while making potential thieves no worse off. I vali-
date this explanation by showing that the model reflects the realities of communal palm
harvesting in Nigeria during the 1930s and 1940s, as captured in colonial Native Court
records. Disputes concerning palm harvesting reflect a split between property-owning
elders and youths who wished to steal oil in order to pay for bride price, taxation, school-
ing, and other expenses that required cash. Monitoring was costly, though simpler with
common property, and communal harvesting was an institution that limited harvest-
ing effort. I discuss the implications of the model for the introduction of colonial taxes,
and argue that youths’ needs to collect oil for tax payment made it rational for elders to
surrender some of their rights. This too is evident in the court records.2
This model and the evidence from Igbo society are relevant to three broader ques-
tions. First, why does common property exist? Demsetz (1967) argues that private prop-
erty emerges to internalize externalities when the gains outweigh the costs. The two
most cited sources of inefficiency associated with common property are the failure to
externalize externalities (Hardin, 1968),3 and reduced incentives for private individu-
als to expend effort in raising their private returns (North, 1990). Division will be par-
ticularly beneficial when investment is needed for conservation (Baland and Platteau,
2003). Boserup (1965), alternatively, focuses on population pressure as the root of pri-
vate property over land. These explanations, based on externalities and scarcity, suggest
that trade will cause a shift away from common property.
1In this paper, I use the standard division of property regimes into four types. First, under open access, no
property rights exist and unrestricted use of the resource is available to all. This is not relevant to the case
under study, except in instances where communal harvesting arrangements collapsed, so that access
was unregulated. Second, under state property, the government owns the resource and has exclusive
control over its use. This is not relevant to the present study. Third, under private property, an individual,
corporation, or other small group can exclude others and regulate use of the resource. Fourth, under
common property, an identifiable community of users can exclude others and regulate use.
2The relationship between taxation and common property is not unique to Nigeria. In Russia, for exam-
ple, peasant communes facilitated the collecion of collectively-owed taxes (Nafziger, 2010).
3Although a standard critique of Hardin (1968) is that he is implicitly criticizing open access and not
common property, rent dissipation and resource depletion can still result if the community is constrained
in its ability to regulate users.
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These views do not allow for other outcomes, such as degeneration into open-access
property (Baland and Platteau, 1998). By contrast, the literature on common prop-
erty resources (e.g. Baland and Francois (2005); Baland and Platteau (2003); Grantham
(1980); McCloskey (1975a,b, 1976); Netting (1976); Ostrom (1991); Runge (1986)) stresses
scale economies, risk pooling, and equity as benefits that help explain why the com-
mons survives. This literature also emphasizes problems with enclosure that limit its
benefits. Division entails surveying, defining, registering, marking, and defending rights,
all of which are costly. Those who benefit from division may not have the power to de-
mand it. Monitoring common property may be cheaper, since users can work together
to monitor each other and exclude outsiders. If there are limited returns to investment,
the benefits of division may be low.
Formal treatments, similarly, show that movement towards private property is nei-
ther inevitable nor necessarily efficient. Hafer (2006) argues that ownership reveals in-
formation about the owner’s defensive ability, so that rights become more secure over
time. Tornell (1997), by contrast, provides a growth model in which the equilibrium
moves from common to private property and then back to common property. Gon-
zalez (2007) finds that an equilibrium with more secure rights and faster growth may
be Pareto-dominated by one with less secure rights and slower growth. de Meza and
Gould (1992) argue that private decisions to enclose land need not be socially efficient.
Grossman and Kim (1995) show that the social cost of appropriative activities may be a
hump-shaped function of these activities’ effectiveness.
Second, what facilitates collective action? For common property to work, communi-
ties must be able to effectively regulate the commons. The literature (cited above, also
Baland and Platteau (1999); McCarthy et al. (2001); Olson (1965); Tarui (2007); Wade
(1987)) suggests several conditions for successful collective action. Group cohesiveness
provides past experiences of cooperation, existing arrangements, punishment systems,
networks of mutual obligation, shared norms of reciprocity, trust, clear and stable group
membership, and low rates of exit. Violations of social rules must be well-defined, es-
pecially in the enforcement of uncoordinated mechanisms (Greif, 1993). Feasibility de-
mands that inexpensive means of conflict resolution and clear boundaries exist, so that
intruders and violators are readily detectable and easily punished. Information about
the limits of the resource convinces users to participate in regulation. Resource value
makes regulation vital and worthwhile. Inequality and population have ambiguous ef-
fects.
Third, how does trade affect the commons? Trade may shape the sustainability of re-
source use and the nature of property rights. Taylor and Brander (1997) suggest that, in
an open-access setting, international trade can be welfare-reducing, as price increases
are offset by greater resource exhaustion. Lopez (1998) shows that higher agricultural
prices in Coˆte d’Ivoire have increased depletion of common-property biomass. This is
part of a larger debate over the impact of trade on renewable resources and how this
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is conditioned by institutions (e.g. Ferreira (2004, 2007); Foster and Rosenzweig (2003);
Lopez (1997)). Hotte et al. (2000) suggest that trade can convert open access into private
property, though this may not be socially efficient. Copeland and Taylor (2009) argue
that, at low prices, open access should prevail. With price increases, however, private
property, limited management, or the continued open access will occur, depending on
state capacity, resource growth, and technology. In practice, many communities, rang-
ing from irrigation users in the Philippines to herders in Switzerland, have been able to
successfully regulate common property for commercial use (Ostrom, 1991).
In the Igbo case, there were no economies of scale in palm harvesting, and there is
no evidence that communal harvesting served as insurance. Rather, equity (ensuring
all members of the community could pay their tax), political considerations, and, most
significantly, the costs of maintaining private property relative to those of monitoring
collective harvesting drove the adoption of imachi nkwu.4 I argue that the rising value
of palm oil spurred collective action among the Igbo. The Igbo implemented collective
palm-cutting in relatively small, homogenous communities, using already-existing in-
stitutions of local governance. Difficulties in defining the boundaries both of private
groves and those areas belonging to specific communities made this regulation more
difficult. Trade did not erode the commons.
While I look at one society, this study has broader implications. The basic result is
that common property can limit the costs of competing over natural resources. If this
competition becomes more intense as the value of the resource rises, common prop-
erty will become more attractive relative to private property, not less. The Igbo lived in
small, closely knit communities. This facilitated detection of violations of the commu-
nal harvesting rules and prevented the costs of common property from rising as quickly
with commercialization. This will be true of any scheme that gives the broader com-
munity an interest in preserving the communal arrangement. The costs of competition
rise with the value of the resource in the model because the effort expended in defend-
ing private property rises along with the incentive to steal. Here, the essential feature
of Igbo society is that defense of property was largely private. The result, then, is most
relevant where state enforcement of private property is weak. This is not true only of
small agrarian communities, but of many situations in developing countries (de Soto,
2003; Field, 2007). Finally, this case will be most relevant to examples where it is simpler
4Monitoring here refers to members of the community and, to a lesser extent, neighboring communities.
Protection of palm-groves from encroachment by in-migrants did not drive the adoption of communal
harvesting. Udo (1975, p. 69-71) stresses that most migrants who established themselves in Igbo territory
in order to harvest palm fruits did so in areas such as Ahoada and Nike that were less-densely settled,
or areas such as Asa, where “the oil palm receives little attention from the local male population which
concentrates on producing garri, a local staple from cassava, for sale to the nearby urban centres.” Udo
(1975, p. 126-137) does not list centralization of control of palm trees among the strategies adopted by
local communities for dealing with conflicts between themselves and migrants.
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to monitor that resource extraction has occurred, rather than where or how much. Ap-
plications would include fisheries with a single harbor or forestry with a limited number
of access roads.
In the next section, I provide background on Igbo history, land tenure, and the prac-
tice of imachi nkwu. In Section 3, I outline a game in which a rise in the price of palm oil
may lead private property to be converted to a Pareto-improving communal alternative.
In Section 4, I describe the primary sources I use to support the model. I then use these
to show that the model is a good description of the larger palaver over palm cutting in
colonial Igbo society. In Section 5, I extend the model to evaluate how the introduction
of direct taxation under colonial rule altered property rights over trees. I compare these
predictions to evidence from the primary sources. In Section 6, I conclude.
2. THE IGBO, PALM OIL, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
2.1. The Igbo. The Igbo are Nigeria’s third-largest ethnic group, and under colonial rule
lived mostly in the Owerri, Ogoja, Onitsha and Calabar provinces. The Igbo lived during
this period largely in communities ranging from half a square mile to over six miles in
extent, with populations between a few hundred and over two thousand (Gailey, 1970,
p. 23). Authority was decentralized in pre-colonial Igbo society with power divided be-
tween the amala (village council), the Ezeala (Earth priest), umokpara (the ofo-holders,
or compound heads), the okonko secret society, and the age grades (Oriji, 1991, p. 31-
42). From roughly 1900 until 1929, British rule was carried out in Igboland using a sys-
tem of “warrant chiefs,” who sat as members of local Native Courts (Afigbo, 1972). In
1928, annual poll taxes on adult males ranging from 4 shillings (s) to 7s were introduced.
Late in 1929, the “Women Riot” against taxation, the warrant chiefs, the native courts
and the depressed state of trade prompted reforms (Martin, 1988, p. 106). Native Courts
were created, comprised in each village-group of a “massed bench of elders,” while Na-
tive Authorities were established that included the eldest man of each ezi (compound)
and any young men they chose to co-opt (Martin, 1988, p. 121). Records from these
reformed Native Courts are the principal sources for the study.
Palm products were the most important Igbo exports during the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, and they were leading suppliers of this produce (Lynn, 1997, p. 34). Fig-
ure 1 gives prices and quantities in the palm oil trade between Britain and West Africa
from 1817 to 1939.5 The increase in nominal palm oil prices was not uninterrupted,
but the rise in Igbo purchasing power was; the ratio of palm oil to cotton textile prices
rose continuously over the nineteenth century, which helps explain why exports were
5Although time series for specific regions of West Africa are not readily available for the nineteenth cen-
tury, the bulk of this trade was from what later became Nigeria. Lynn (1997, p. 20) reports that roughly
80% of British palm oil imports in 1849-51 were from Biafran ports, and a further 5% came from the Bight
of Benin. Similarly, no time series of local prices are available for the nineteenth century. Dike (1956,
p. 50) states that, while the price in Liverpool was roughly £28 per ton in 1832, the local price averaged
£14, though it could be as low as £5 in the less frequented rivers of the Niger Delta.
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FIGURE 1. British Palm Oil Trade with West Africa, 1790-1939
Sources: Relative prices are from Allen (2011). Imports to 1898 are from Lynn (1997). Exports from 1906
are from Martin (1988) and Usoro (1974).
steadily increasing (Allen, 2011). Palm trees were rarely planted on purpose. One offi-
cial estimated in 1907 that there were 6 palms per acre in the vicinity of Aba (Martin,
1988, p. 46). Palm fruits could be harvested year-round, though the greatest yields were
achieved between January and May (Martin, 1988, p. 34). Assessment Reports for five
Native Court areas of the Aba and Bende Divisions estimated that palm produce con-
tributed between 1% and 51% of household income, averaging 20%.6 In the Aba Native
Court Area (NCA), for example, palm nuts were cut every 24 days. On each occasion a
man would cut approximately 5 heads of fruit – enough to produce 3 tins of oil (worth
18s) and 400 lbs of kernels (worth£2/4/0) over the course of a year (Abadist 9/1/1362).7
6Abadist files 8/11/2, 14/1/1077, 8/11/12, 9/1/1362, and 9/1/1362.
7The accuracy of these estimates should not be overstated. Gailey (1970, p. 91-93) outlines the difficulties
faced by the administrative officers in making their reports. While their estimates of total income gener-
ally fell between £14 and £16, the Assessment Report for Degema Division gave a figure of £64, which the
Resident (the highest provincial official) dismissed as obviously wrong. Further, these were put together
knowing that direct taxation would soon be introduced. Weir believed that other officials had grossly
overestimated the value of palm produce due to the coexistence of communal and individually owned
trees and to the high proportions of trees not bearing fruit (Abadist 8/11/12).
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2.2. Property rights and imachi nkwu. Three principles guided Igbo land tenure dur-
ing the late colonial period: all land ultimately belongs to community and cannot be
alienated without consent, within the community an individual has security of tenure,
and no member of the landholding group is without land (Jones, 1949, p. 313). With
some exceptions, the “village group” or “town” of four to five thousand people was usu-
ally the relevant landholding unit, and was generally coextensive with the maximal pa-
trilineage (Jones, 1949, p. 309). Despite the principle of communal ownership, reason-
ably secure, permanent, and inheritable rights to farmland were frequently owned by
minor lineages and even by individuals (Jones, 1949, p. 314). Ofo-holders had exclusive
control over okpara (ancestral) land, though in theory they acted only as “custodians”
of these plots and could not alienate them without consent of other members of the
lineage.8
The rules governing trees are more ambiguous. Anthropological, legal and historical
sources give less attention to these. Further, regulations varied considerably from place
to place. Thomas (1913) outlines tree tenure in Asaba division, giving brief descriptions
that differ for each village he visited. Similarly, Leeming wrote in 1927 of the Asa NCA
that:
The nuts are collected upon different principles in different villages of this
area. In some there is a day definitely fixed upon which the village will col-
lect communally and competitively. In other villages no such rules exist
and people may collect where and when they will. In some cases the fruit
of the trees in the immediate vicinity of the village is reserved for the older
people (Abadist 14/1/1077).
Obi (1963, p. 93) notes as well that, in some areas, palm nuts could be harvested at
will, but in others appointed days were set aside for reaping. In some instances, the
entire village met on certain days, pooling their harvests together to be used for public
purposes.
Some general principles can, however, be identified. Trees surrounding compounds
were “household palms,” and were usually owned by individuals (Chubb, 1961, p. 49).
Where wild palms existed in groves, they were usually free to all members of a village,
though they were often left un-harvested (Chubb, 1961, p. 50). On farmland, it was ac-
tionable to enter a farm for the purpose of gathering palm nuts between the period
when it was cleared and when the harvest was reaped (Obi, 1963, p. 49). Where they
were scattered on farmland not presently under cultivation, palms were generally free
to anyone in the kinship group (Chubb, 1961, p. 51).
The rights that existed over palm trees in Igbo society before the adoption of com-
munal palm cutting were not, then, always individual. This has led Northrup (1978,
p. 187) to argue that “communal” systems were retained by the Igbo in response to the
8In the court records, groves on ancestral land are referred to using the terms okpulor, okpulor ika or
okpulo.
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palm oil trade, but that these became “more closely regulated.” There are two reasons
why his interpretation does not fully describe the institutional change that occurred.
First, groups such as families and quarters that had exclusive rights to certain trees sur-
rendered them to the greater community when communal harvesting was introduced.
Second, specific individuals (mostly elders) had individual claims to particular groves
that were weakened or dismissed entirely under communal harvesting.
Colonial and anthropological evidence suggests that many Igbo areas of southeast-
ern Nigeria responded to the export trade in palm produce during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries by limiting their recognition of the exclusive rights held by certain
individuals and lineages over palm trees. In their place, Igbo groups such as the Ngwa
enacted the practice of imachi nkwu, or communal palm-cutting.9 Allen noted it in
his Intelligence Report on the Ngwa (SP021 CSE 1/85/3708), as well as his unpublished
“Ngwa Customs,” which is quoted at length by Chubb (1961, p. 48-49):
As soon as the commercial value of palm-oil and kernels was appreciated
by the people, new regulations were formulated by the village councils
to control the taking of produce from communal trees. Gradually these
regulations were tightened up until at the present time strict laws exist
governing the ownership of all palm trees in a community. The majority
of palm trees in a village are now reserved for the community, no matter
whether they are of natural growth or have been planted by an individ-
ual... In order that each member of the community shall receive an equal
benefit, and to prevent deterioration of the trees through continual cut-
ting, a certain day is set apart generally once in 20 days, when every mem-
ber of the community may cut as much produce as he desires. On this
day a drum (Nkwa Nkwu) is beaten... This drum is in the care of an elder
of the village, who is specially selected for this duty by the village coun-
cil. Until this drum has been beaten any member of the community who
9The term itself comes from Chuku (2005, p. 51). The timing of events is claimed by Allen in both his
unpublished “Ngwa Customs” and his Intelligence Report on the Ngwa (SP021 CSE 1/85/3708), with sup-
porting evidence offered by Chubb (1961), Obi (1963), Bridges (1938) and Green (1941). Allen’s intelli-
gence report, p. 33, states that “when palm oil began to assume a commercial value it was felt that a poor
man with little land would reap little profit therefrom while the income of the wealthier citizens would be
greatly augmented. This offended the communal spirit of the Ngwas, who therefore wisely ordained that
all of the oil palms in a village should become the property of the community, no matter who might be the
owner of the land on which they stood.” Thereafter, no one was to cut on communal trees expect on fixed
days, four times every three months. Falk (1920) is the only assertion I have found that the reverse was
true; whereas in the past palm trees had been open to all for cultivation, he claims that with population
growth harvesting rights became limited to members of the landowning family or compound. Mayne, by
mentioning regulated communal harvesting in his Assessment Report on the Umuahia Native Court Area
(Abadist 8/11/12) provides evidence that this predated the introduction of direct taxation.
The existence of common property in Igbo land tenure and palm harvesting is mentioned extensively
in anthropological and legal work by both Igbo and white authors. It appears in the assessment reports
and in the Native Court records. There is no evidence that the existence of these communal aspects are a
fiction invented under colonial rule, however they may have been modified by it.
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takes produce from communal palm trees is guilty of an offence for which
he may be fined one goat, or the equivalent of £1 by the village council.
Since the introduction of general tax this system has been extended to in-
clude trees which in ordinary circumstances are privately owned. At the
commencement of tax collection an order is promulgated by the village
council to the effect that for a specific period, generally three months, the
ownership of all private palm trees will be vested in the community.
Similar institutions were employed by the Aro, in Umuahia, and in other densely pop-
ulated areas of Owerri Province (Chubb (1961, p. 49), Chuku (2005, p. 51)). Chuku (2005,
p. 51) writes that this was imposed three months a year for men and once for women,
with the money being used for community projects such as schools. She infers from
this that family and lineage heads used communal harvesting to extend their power to
dictate the intervals of harvesting at the expense of women’s freedom of choice.10
Allen explains imachi nkwu as a result of the palm oil trade and the “communal spirit”
of the Igbo. Green (1941, 1964) adds taxes to this explanation. Green (1941) conducted
fieldwork during 1935 and 1937 at Umueke Agbaja, in the south of Okigwi Division.
While she found little land was left under group control (Green, 1964, p. 88), rights over
palms were in “an interesting state of ambiguity,” and during her stay “the pendulum
swung uneasily between the restriction of rights to those who owned the land on which
the palms stood and the extension of rights to anyone to cut anywhere” (Green, 1941,
p. 17).
She was told that, in the past, people had restricted cutting palm nuts to trees on their
own land, but during a period when the population dwindled, “it was decided that all
should cut where they liked throughout Umueke” (Green, 1941, p. 18). With time, the
population again rose and cutting was once more limited to land of one’s own lineage.
The eldest man in the village had been instrumental in passing the restriction “because
he himself had many palm trees on his land. One also noticed that he was an elderly
man whose climbing and cutting capacity would be less than that of a vigorous youth”
(Green, 1941, p. 17). The rule had been passed, she was told, because “the strongest
people cut to the detriment of the less strong” (Green, 1941, p. 17). Further, her infor-
mants stated that “it was the coming of tax that caused the swing over from relatively
communal to private rights. Some people who were unable to climb saw others climb-
ing the palms on their land and cutting the nuts, but when they asked these people to
help them pay their tax they were refused, to their great vexation” (Green, 1941, p. 17).
10The circumscription of women’s formal rights over land does not mean that they were unable to find
creative means of exercising their claims. In UNC 24/38, the defendants had pledged a piece of land to
the plaintiff for £2 when their husband fell into debt. The plaintiff refused to accept the plot without
male witnesses. After the defendants encroached on the land and planted yams, he sued. The second
defendant turned male authority into a rhetorical device, pleading to the court that “we are women and
we never knew what was going on since our husband was in trouble, we consented and they made agree-
ment...we are women how can we pledge amala’s bush?”
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This was the status quo when she first arrived in 1935, but it was an arrangement
that could not last. Towards the end of the year, the young men of the village challenged
this law, and through intimidation were successful in demanding cutting be again made
communal. In their dealings with the elders, they stated that:
if the latter had refused to concede what they wanted they would have
seized their cows and sheep and sold them, since they must live somehow.
As [her informant] said, it is all very well for the old men, they have all got
wives, but the young ones have still to get together bride price to marry
theirs and they need palm oil to sell (Green, 1941, p. 18).
By 1937, when Green returned to Umueke, she found that an “intermediate” position
had been reached between the two extremes of communal and private rights over palms
(Green, 1941, p. 19). From this, she argues that “anything tending to increase the need
for money – the introduction of tax, the increasing demand for European clothing, for
schooling and so on” made the definition of rights more important and contentious, by
raising the value of the ability to cut palm nuts (Green, 1941, p. 19).
3. MODEL
In this section, I outline a model of the defense of property. I demonstrate that, as
the price of palm oil rises, Pareto-improving alternatives to private property become
available. There were two advantages of common property in the Igbo context, which
were made more attractive by a rise in the price of palm oil:
(1) Monitoring under private property was largely undertaken by the property owner
or his relatives, was non-cooperative, and required proving that a thief had at-
tempted to steal oil from the owner’s trees. Under communal property, all that
needed to be observed was that the thief cut on the wrong day. Any member of
the community could catch a thief. As the effort expended on stealing rose with
the price of oil, the cost of increasing monitoring in order to compensate rose
less quickly under communal property than private property.
(2) Communal harvesting gave former thieves incentives to monitor theft that they
did not have under private property. First, anything stolen from the property
owner was now also taken away from their share of the harvest, giving these po-
tential victims greater incentive to monitor, though this would be limited by the
obvious problems of free-riding. The value of this loss rose with the price of oil.
Second, theft often occurred before palm fruits were fully ripe. These costs of
early harvesting were now borne in part by those who before would have been
thieves. Since these incentives allowed aggregate monitoring to be greater under
communal property, the marginal returns to effort in theft were lower, and so
the incentive to steal did not rise as quickly with the price of oil as under private
property.
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The model simplifies these advantages, focusing on a game between one youth and
one elder. The first advantage is captured below as a lower marginal cost of monitoring
under communal property. The second advantage is captured indirectly by the model.
Under communal property, stealing by the youth reduces the amount of un-stolen oil
distributed communally, and hence his share. This dissuades him from stealing.
3.1. Setup. There are two players – one elderE and one youth Y . The elder possesses a
grove of trees that yield one unit of oil, which can be sold for a price of p. At the beginning
of the game, the elder chooses between private property and communal property. If the
elder chooses communal property, he also chooses at the outset what share θ of any un-
stolen oil he will offer the youth. This is done subject to the constraint that he leaves the
youth as well off under communal property as under private property. The purpose of
this model is to demonstrate that, under reasonable conditions that fit those of the case
under study, an increase in the price of palm oil can lead the elder to prefer communal
property to private property.
Under either regime, there are two stages. In the first stage, the elder chooses a level of
costly monitoring, defending his grove against theft. This monitoring affects the youth’s
cost of stealing in the second stage. At the beginning of the second stage, the youth
chooses how much oil to steal. Under private property, the elder consumes whatever is
left over. Under communal property, he shares the un-stolen remains with the youth,
keeping a share 1− θ for himself and giving a share θ to the youth.
3.2. Private property. I begin by discussing outcomes under private property. In the
first stage, the elder chooses his level of monitoring e. This costs him de, where d ≥ 1
2
is the elder’s marginal cost of monitoring effort.11 If the youth steals a share s of the oil,
which will be a function of e, the elder is able to recover (1− s(e)) units of oil at the end
of the second stage. Hence, his problem is:
V PE = max
e
{(1− s(e))p− de}
In the second stage, the youth takes e as given. He chooses a fraction of the oil s ∈ [0, 1]
to steal. This costs the youth es
1−s . Hence, the youth’s problem is:
V PY = max
s∈[0,1]
{ps− es
1− s}
The youth’s best response (from the first order conditions of the above problem), then,
is:
sPBR = max{1−
√
e
p
, 0}
11The restriction that d ≥ 12 is done to simplify the analysis, since it ensures an interior solution. This
does not substantially affect the results; robustness of the results are discussed in footnote 13.
12 JAMES FENSKE
The assumption that d ≥ 1
2
ensures the elder’s optimal monitoring will be less than p,
the level of monitoring that drives the youth’s stealing to zero, simplifying the exposition
by guaranteeing an interior solution. The elder’s optimal e (which is the equilibrium e) is
found by substituting this into his problem above, and taking the first order conditions:
eP∗ =
p
4d2
Substituting into the youth’s best response function gives equilibrium stealing:
sP∗ = 1−
1
2d
Substituting the equilibrium e and s values into the parties’ objective functions gives
their payoffs:
V PE =
p
4d
V PY =
(
1− 1
2d
)2
p
3.3. Communal harvesting. Under communal property, the elder begins by offering a
share θ of any un-stolen oil to the youth. He is willing to do this because the costs of
monitoring under communal property are lower, for reasons outlined above. In partic-
ular, his marginal cost of monitoring is now γ, where d > γ > 1
2
. It is assumed he can
commit to θ; in practice, youth harvested their own share. Communal property, how-
ever, also entails a fixed administrative cost of k¯. This captures the cost of organizing
and overseeing the harvest according to a set schedule of days.12
Thus, the elder’s problem in the first stage is:
V CE = max
e
{(1− s(e))(1− θ)p− γe− k¯}
The youth takes e as given when choosing how much to steal. In addition to what he
steals, he receives a share θ of the un-stolen oil. Hence, his problem in the second stage
is:
V CY = max
s∈[0,1]
{ps− es
1− s + (1− s)θp}
The youth’s best response (from the first order conditions), then, is:
sPBR = max{1−
√
e
(1− θ)p, 0}
12Without k¯, the elder’s payoff under communal property will still rise relative to his payoff under private
property as p rises. k¯ ensures that a rise in the price of oil will induce a switch; without k¯, communal
property would be preferred for any p. Without this assumption, the widening gap between the elder’s
payoff under communal and private property could be used to explain a transition from private property
to communal property in response to rising prices if, instead, an initial state of private property and
switching costs were assumed.
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The elder’s optimal e (which is the equilibrium e) is found by substituting this into his
problem above, and taking the first order conditions:
eC∗ =
(1− θ)p
4γ2
The assumption γ > 1
2
assures an interior solution.13 Substituting into the youth’s best
response function gives equilibrium stealing:
sC∗ = 1−
1
2γ
Substituting the equilibrium e and s values into each party’s objective function gives
the elder’s payoff conditional on θ:
V CE = max
θ
(1− θ)p
4γ
− k¯
s.t.
(
θ + (1− θ)
(
1− 1
2γ
)2)
p ≥
(
1− 1
2d
)2
p
The elder will choose the minimum θ that satisfies the youth’s participation constraint
that V CY ≥ V PY . In particular, he will choose:
θ∗(γ, d) = 1− γ
2(4d− 1)
d2(4γ − 1)
.
Thus, the two parties’ payoffs under communal property are given by:
V CE =
(1− θ∗(γ, d))p
4γ
− k¯
V CY =
(
1− 1
2d
)2
p
13This is again done only to simplify the exposition. If I drop the assumptions that γ > 12 and d >
1
2 , then
there are two cases to consider:
(1) 0.5 > d > γ: Here, both the private and communal cases are at a corner solution. substituting in
e = p and s = 0 gives V PE = (1−d)p. If the elder chooses θ so that the youth is at least as well off as
under private property he can set θ = 0, because the youth gets nothing under private property.
Thus, V CE = (1− γ)p− k¯. The elder will prefer communal property if p > (d−γ)k¯ , which is positive
due to the assumption that d > γ.
(2) d > 0.5 > γ: Here, the communal case is at a corner solution, but the private case is not. Thus, the
elder receives a payoff of (1− γ)(1− θ)p− k¯ under communal property, while the youth receives
θp. The elder must choose θ so that the youth’s payoff is at least his payoff under private property,
so that θ =
(
1 − 12d
)2
. The elder’s payoff is thus V CE = (1 − γ)
(
1 −
(
1 − 12d
)2)
p − k¯. The elder
will prefer communal property if p > 4d
2k¯
(1−γ)(4d−1)−d . This is positive under the assumption that
d > 0.5 > γ.
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3.4. Commercialization. The elder will prefer communal property when V CE ≥ V PE .
From the above expressions, this is equivalent to stating that he will prefer communal
property when:
p ≥ 4dγk¯
d(1− θ∗(γ, d))− γ
That this is a positive cutoff for p can be verified by substituting in for θ∗(γ, d) and
invoking the assumption that d > γ. This is the main result of the model: a rise in the
price of palm oil can induce the elder to switch to communal property in order to reduce
monitoring costs, leading the youth no worse off.
3.5. Other responses. Communal harvesting need not be the only option elders had
available to cope with the rising costs of monitoring under private property. Why did
they not respond by cooperating in their defense of private property, manipulating the
village council in order to more cheaply protect their rights, or simply pay the youth to
harvest for them?
Cooperative monitoring by the elders would have entailed a more severe collective
action problem than communal harvesting. Whereas youths would have a direct inter-
est in protecting their communal share from theft, other property owners had no direct
interest in each other’s property. Cooperative monitoring, then, would have to be sus-
tained solely through repeated interaction. Economies of scale only exist in this type of
monitoring in so far as there are spill-overs across private plots. Further, even if scale
economies were to exist, the costs of this monitoring must decline more sharply with
increased stealing effort than the costs of monitoring under communal property for the
predictions of the model to change.
Judicial manipulation would have been self defeating. The village council was used to
settle many disputes aside from palm harvesting. Traditionally, the village council gave
orders for cleaning paths, regulated prices, and dealt with both economic and “minor
judicial” matters, including issues arising within a single family or age grade (SP 021 CSE
1/85/3708). Damaging its credibility in this case would have made it less useful in other
instances, especially as the village council did not have a monopoly over dispute reso-
lution (SP 021 CSE 1/85/3708). Further, if the standard of proof were lowered artificially,
punishments meted out by the village council would have become more arbitrary, and
would not have been effective deterrents.
Wage labor was problematic for several reasons. Suppose elders must monitor the
youths in their employ to discover whether they have kept any oil for themselves. If the
costs of supervising wage laborers were to rise along with the incentive for the worker to
keep some of the oil, the elder would come to prefer communal harvesting to the wage
if the price rose past a certain threshold. Alternatively, Bellemare and Barrett (2003)
suggest that giving too large a share of a resource to a tenant can create a risk of expro-
priation; elders may have feared that giving up symbolic control of the harvest would
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have led to them losing control of their palms altogether. I give examples below where
control of palms was politically valuable. Further, the timing of this payment presented
a problem. Either elders would have to pay youth out of cash reserves prior to the har-
vest, or payment in cash afterwards would create the possibility of a hold up problem.
Further, wage labor was generally absent in the first half of the twentieth century.
What wage labor did exist by the end of the colonial period was largely migrant and sea-
sonal (Uchendu, 1965, p. 32). Martin (1988, p. 87-88) notes that, during the early twenti-
eth century, “[m]arriage rather than contractual wage relationships continued to be the
mainstay of labor recruitment.” Hired labor was a minor component of the labor supply
in pre-colonial Igboland. Slaves, age mates, and clientelist relationships remained im-
portant means of labor recruitment through the first half of the century (Brown, 2003,
p. 38).14
3.6. Other considerations. The model above abstracts away from reciprocity, observ-
ability, credibility of punishment, and Igbo seniority structures.
Adding reciprocity, the tendency to “reward kind actions and punish unkind ones”
(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), would strengthen the case for common property. In pub-
lic goods games, altruistic types will generally punish free riders, encouraging greater
contributions (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). Reciprocity would have two effects. First, while
I have not modeled monitoring by the youth under common property, reciprocity would
sustain greater aggregate monitoring than self-interest alone. This would reduce the re-
turns to effort in theft, reinforcing the tendency for common property to become more
attractive as the price rises. In addition, a youth motivated by reciprocity will view a
relatively high offer of θ as “kind,” and reciprocate by lowering his effort in theft. This
will make common property more rewarding to the elder, as it would partially offset the
cost of an increase in θ, a benefit that would also rise with the price.
Adding observability would add little to the model. s could be interpreted as the prob-
ability that the youth steals successfully, while e raises the cost of evading detection. The
model excludes punishment. The evidence below, however, makes it clear that thieves
were sometimes taken before the village council. If punishment is costly, repeated in-
teraction is needed to make it credible. Credibility would be greater under common
property, because the greater number of potential witnesses and lower burden of proof
reduced the costs of proving a case (see below). In addition, in experimental public
goods games that resemble the common property scenario, individuals will punish bad
behavior, even if it is costly, provides them no material benefits, and is not observed
(Carpenter, 2007; Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010; Masclet et al., 2003).
14It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the absence of wage labor in Igbo society. Two of the
dominant explanations for the absence of labor markets in much of Africa are low population densities
and seasonal bottlenecks, and cultural factors. The Igbo, however, occupy one of the most densely pop-
ulated parts of Africa (Nwokeji, 2000). The elders’ need to defend their groves is evidence that the youth
had time to spare in gathering palm produce. Neither of these explanations, then, suffice.
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Finally, the seniority structure of Igbo society will discourage theft in both the private
and common property scenarios. A youth who expects to become an elder by playing
by the rules is more likely to follow either set of rules. Colonial rule gave youth out-
side options beyond their communities and changed the rules of the political hierarchy,
weakening youths’ incentives to observe community rules. This helps explain examples
in the court records where common property arrangements had collapsed, and where
elders’ authority is questioned. This pattern is not unique to Igbo society. The Israeli
kibbutzim, for example, use shared ideology and a loss of wealth on exit to give their
members reasons to stay for the long term (Abramitzky, 2008).
4. EVIDENCE
In this section, I validate the assumptions that drive the results of the model, noting
that conflicts over palm harvesting in Igbo society largely pit elders against youths as
interest groups, that defense of property rights was costly, and that “communal” har-
vesting was used to restrict the effort costs associated with harvesting and monitoring.
The evidence discussed, then, supports the assumptions of the model rather than its
predictions. This is due to the nature of the evidence. The change to communal har-
vesting predates anthropological observations, and is observed only in the retrospective
oral testimony cited above. Where observable transitions to communal harvesting oc-
cur in the court records, they came about in a world of Native Courts and direct taxation
– evidence supporting the implications of this extension are discussed in Section 5.
4.1. Sources. The primary sources I use are from the National Archives of Nigeria at
Enugu. These fall into three categories:
(1) Native Court Records: A selection of Civil Judgment Books from the Aba-Na-
Ohazu (ANO), Nkwo Udara (NU),15 Obohia (ONC), and Ugba (UNC) Native Courts
were used based on their availability. These are the principal sources for this
study.16
(2) CSE : Central Secretary’s Office, Nigeria, 1906-1940. This contains a variety of
correspondence, including Intelligence Reports.
(3) Abadist : This series contains documents and correspondence relating to Aba Di-
vision, including Assessment Reports. Land dispute records in these files gener-
ally contain facsimiles of the relevant court proceedings as well as petitions to
colonial officials about the judgments rendered and correspondence between
officials concerning these cases. A sample from this series has been included in
the Web Appendix.17
15This series contains judgments from the Mvosi (MGC), Ovuku (OVU), Ovuoko (OVO), and Ovokwu
(OVW) Group Courts.
16Citations of these cases are abbreviated for legibility. For example, Nkwo Udara civil suit 140 of 1935 is
cited as NU 140/35
17See http://www.jamesfenske.com/. Specifically, this is Abadist 9/1/268. I was not able to copy a sample
native court case from the National Archives in Enugu, since these are contained in bound volumes, but
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The Native Court records that are available date mostly from the 1930s and later;
Afigbo (1972) and Adewoye (1977) both outline the history of the courts from which
these records are taken. Generally, these are rough transcripts handwritten in English by
the court clerk during proceedings. Each record begins by stating the names and home
villages of the plaintiffs and defendants; in cases involving violations of palm-cutting
regulations, it is not uncommon to see more than ten defendants in a single case. The
statement of grievance and any claim for damages are also given. Parties each make
opening statements and call witnesses. Cross-examination by the opposing party and
the court is common. Cases are often adjourned for further witnesses, inspection of the
land, or swearing of juju.18 The court’s decision is recorded, along with any statement
by the president.
4.2. Intergenerational conflict. A typical civil suit over palm harvesting in the court
records involves an elder, either alone or on behalf of the amala (village council), bring-
ing action against a youth or group of youths either for trespass on a private okpulor
(private grove) or for violating the village’s rules concerning communal palm-cutting.
This division between youth and elders is captured by the model above. Even the lan-
guage of statements in court reflects the fact that disputes over property were largely
conflicts between generations. In NU 195/37, Ovumoegbu, representing the elders, told
the court that “Our village palm cutting is not in order... We never put a law for the young
ones to stop cutting the palm nuts.” In some of the records, the statement of claim itself
is for “cutting the elders’ palm nuts.”19 UNC 62/35 pitted 35 youth against the elders of
Amandara, including the defendants’ “father,” who had become “greatly annoyed” with
them for not answering the summons of the amala (village council) after “all the elders
came out with the wooden bell to know whether the dfdts [defendants] were guilty.” In
NU 55/25, the plaintiff Onwunka sued in his capacity as “the elder.” The defendant had
been summoned by the amala (village council) through his father, but had refused to
come.
The facts of the cases further show the desire of youth to harvest more from trees un-
der either the ownership or control of elders. In UNC 115/35, the village youth had gone
to view the palm nuts before cutting them, and reported that people from a neighboring
village had cut them. The next day, while the elders were away investigating a separate
dispute, the defendants harvested the fruits. One of the defendants, who admitted in
court that the drum had only been rung for street-sweeping and after he had finished
cutting, referred to the plaintiff as his “father.” The plaintiff of a different suit told the
court that a specific day had been appointed for only the elders to cut palm fruits; the
defendant, who he said “respects no elder,” cut on that day. The defendant, in his own
the transcript of Umuaro Native Court Civil Suit 283/33 contained in this record is of the same format as
the cases in these books.
18An object supposed to have magical properties, or the power associated with it. The word is of Hausa
origin.
19See OGC 405/35 for an example.
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defense, argued that he had given the stockfish necessary to become an elder, but had
not been permitted to join the amala (village council) (NU 140/35).
The model emphasizes the distinction between elders and youths on the basis of their
differing endowments of resources, and the consequent interests of elders in limiting
the harvest effort of youth. To this must be added their differing demands for cash
(stressed by Green (1941)), motivations of spite, and struggles for political power. The
fragile authority of some elders is revealed by MGC 161/36. Osuenyieke, the eldest man
in his village, told the court that he had been forced by the young men to join a “tax
meeting.” When he hired two men to cut palm fruits from his trees, he had been fined
10s.
These generational conflicts were not only economic. They were also contests over
political power. Whether palm trees were harvested communally or privately, control
over them was a tool with which to wield political authority. Leeming reported that a
common privilege of office for headmen and ezealas (Earth priests) in the Aba NCA was
“the custom which widely maintained that on certain days palm kernel heads should be
cut and collected by the townsmen in clearing the bush for his farm.” (Abadist 9/1/1362).
Oriji (2007) argues that these privileges were a consequence of the taboos needed to
maintain the sacredness of authority in Igbo society. Since the ezealas (earth priests)
and okparas (elders) were not permitted to engage in mundane economic activities,
they were dependent on tribute. The plaintiff in NU 313/38 told the court that, as the
oldest man in his compound, “every family right has been invested to me, all jujus and
family lands are in my care.” The palm nuts for his onumara (quarter), he claimed, were
“given to me by my family to cut and to offer sacrifice to the jujus.” Similarly, the court
found in OVW 11/37 that the eldest man Wogu was “entitled to monopolize the whole
palm groves.”
Where reaping was communal, elders retained symbolic control of the harvest. A wit-
ness for the defence in one case told the court that before the village began cutting, all
the men met together to “see if we are correct and then the elders will instruct us to go
and cut” (NU 256/35). Even when the rules were violated, the amala (village council)
sought to control the process of settlement. The plaintiff in NU 55/35 told the court that
if the defendant had come to “beg” the amala (village council), no action would have
been taken in court. In several of the records, at least one defendant had already settled
in the amala (village council) before the case reached court, weakening the position of
the other defendants who refused to do so.20 In OVO 148/36, the court found that the
defendant had been “heady and very bad” for refusing to comply when the case had
been heard by the amala (village council). His father testified against him, and he was
fined an additional 10s for his behavior.
As political authority was diffused outside the amala (village council), other interests
also exercised social control through regulation of palm cutting. In some villages, the
20See ANO 244/41, UNC 132/38, and OVO 148/36 for examples.
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okonko (secret society) had days specifically reserved for its members to harvest. In one
suit, the defendant claimed that he had left the okonko (secret society) after converting
to Christianity and had since been denied any rights over communal palms. He stated
that “my town people generate this rule to draw me from following my Lord’s way.” This
was part of a larger reaction on the part of traditional authorities against the spread
of Christianity. Faced with Garrick Braide’s iconoclastic evangelism during the 1910s,
Igbo authority holders had “responded by banning those involved from farming in their
communal land, harvesting its oil palm trees, and even nominated them for forced labor
on Sundays. Okonko [secret society] leaders dispatched their executive arm to burn
Christian churches and punish the evangelicals” (Oriji, 2007, p. 277).
Town authorities, similarly, used their control of palms as leverage. In NU 115/35,
the defendant was a stranger who had lived in the town for 10 years, but six months
previously had committed adultery with his half-sister. The elders wished to expel him
from the village, but were unable to do so, and instead fined him £1, denying him the
right to harvest palm nuts until the fine was paid. Palm trees were a source of cash
income, but also a fount of ritual and political authority.
4.3. The costs of defending property. When private rights over palm groves were rec-
ognized, they had to be defended. The costs of maintaining private property could, as
in the model above, be such that a regulated communal harvesting arrangement was
preferred. The quarters of Ukomadu and Umuokiri had united in their palm cutting
“because,” as the defendant in NU 111/37 told the court “at first we were suing against
each other in the court here.” Monitoring effort was costly – thieves had to be caught
in the act. In the sample of court cases, there is no evidence of cooperative defense of
private property.
Witnesses in the court records do not systematically report what they were doing
when thieves and violators of the communal cutting rules were caught, but isolated
examples support the hypothesis that monitoring was more costly with private than
communal harvesting. Landowners often had to depend on their own kin to detect vi-
olators. One of the plaintiff’s witnesses told the court in a 1935 case21 that it was his
children who had caught the defendant. The nature of communal harvesting allowed
monitoring to be carried out by the village as a whole. The witnesses in NU 256/35 indi-
cated that they gathered together before harvesting; this would make supervision easier.
In a 1924 case,22 the plaintiff Orji had not yet rung the wooden bell when one Uboaja re-
ported to him that he had seen a palm tree cut. Orji then ordered that no one should
reap until the perpetrator was found. In OVO 148/36, the amala (village council) had
found the party guilty of violating the communal harvesting rules by making everyone
swear juju – the defendant was the one who had refused. One of the witnesses in a 1933
21Abadist 9/1/794: Mbutu Umu Ujima Group Court Civil Suit 142/35.
22Abadist 13/8/50: Aba Native Court Civil Suit 10/24.
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dispute23 told the court that he and the other youths of Obette had been ordered by the
elders to go into the bush to see if men from neighboring Osa were reaping from trees
on their land. They knew when to lie in wait when they heard the Osa drum being rung,
to signal that harvesting had begun there.
Even when a thief was caught infringing on rights of private property, enforcing judg-
ment was costly, as cases were easily extended by questions of fact or points of law.
Factual disputes most commonly centered around the boundaries on which the trees
stood; this was a central issue in MGC 222/36. Proving facts before the amala (village
council) and in the Native Court required either witnesses or oathing. A party who failed
to bring supporting witnesses, such as the plaintiff in ONC 713/21, could lose on this
ground alone. A witness might not be enough – the reviewing officer in MGC 256/35
only accepted the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness because one of the defendants had
contradicted his own story. Physical evidence was of no use; in UNC 199/38, the plain-
tiff brought to court one bunch of nuts he alleged had been cut by the defendant, but it
would have been impossible from these to tell who had harvested them and from what
tree. Inspection of the land by the court was possible, but also costly and potentially
indeterminate.
Even with witnesses, oaths were frequently used to prove facts. In NU 217/38, the
plaintiff volunteered to swear on a Bible that the defendants had cut palm fruits on his
people’s land. The court found in his favor when the defendants refused to provide a
Bible. The case was later reopened, and an inspection revealed that the defendants had
in fact harvested from their own trees, and the plaintiff had been motivated by malice.
Fear of supernatural punishment was not sufficient to induce truth-telling; the plaintiff
of a land dispute that had been settled against him protested that “after one month from
the time of such swearing of the said juju produced by me, the deft and his people went
to the man from whom I brought the juju, bribed him with £8 plus a fowl, and the man
pronounced that the juju should not kill them again.”24
Often litigants feared that their opponents, given the opportunity to swear falsely,
would do so. The plaintiff in a 1935 case25 had caught the defendant reaping nuts on
his land on three occasions. Five elders testified that they had inspected the land, and
that the trees belonged to the plaintiff, but believed it was noteworthy that the defen-
dant was willing to swear that he had never reaped from the trees in question. One of
the plaintiff’s witnesses clearly feared the court would allow the defendant to take an
oath, and told the court that “I do not want the Court give judgment on juju. The trees
in question really belong to Plff [plaintiff ] I know that very well because I am the elderly
man in Deft’s [defendant’s] compound. Let Court give judgment accordingly.”
23Abadist 9/1/268: Umuaro Native Court Civil Suit 283/33. This case is included in the Web Appendix.
24Abadist 9/1/26: Omuma Civil Suit 25/29.
25Abadist 14/1/504: Arungwa and Amavor Group Court Suit 81/35.
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Points of law were equally pernicious for landowners attempting to defend their rights.
The claim that palms were harvested communally was a common defence; this was the
point of issue, for example, in NU 154/35. Some of these assertions were outright lies.
In one case, it was noted that Umuokoro had originally had a common day for reaping
palms, and that the plaintiff had later sworn juju that “everyone should cut palm fruits
from his land.” He had come to court, however, accusing the defendants of cutting on
the wrong day, and stated that “according to our custom we have no private palm groves
since from origin palm groves planted by anyone in our town are cut in general.” His
claim failed when his duplicity was exposed (OVO 318/36).
In some instances, however, the customary law was actually unclear. In NU 610/37,
the plaintiff’s late brother had pledged land to the defendant’s late father, on which ei-
ther the defendant or his father had planted coconut trees. The plot had since been
redeemed by the plaintiff. The defendant told the court, “I am a boy. I want the court
to decide whether I am entitled to use them, or not.” The case had to be adjourned
so that the court could consult other Ngwa elders who “all agreed that pltf [plaintiff ]
is entitled to whatever thing on his land.” Further, the procedure for redress was com-
plicated by the diffusion of political authority, as disputes could be alternately settled
before the amala (village council), by the okonko (secret society), inside the ezi (com-
pound), within the age-grade, or with the help of the oke amadi, the wealthy members
of the community who Allen labeled “the true de facto rulers of the village” (SP 021 CSE
1/85/3708).
The Native Courts added an extra layer to this complexity and made their own proce-
dural demands. In UNC 150/35, the plaintiff had brought his claim as a criminal suit two
months previously but been ordered to take a civil action. Though he won the latter, the
costs of defending his property in terms of time, effort and cash had increased. Political
concerns also interfered with the working of the Native Courts. In one dispute,26 the
District Officer ordered that the proceedings from an earlier and related case be read to
the court. The plaintiff, writing for an appeal, complained that this had not been done,
“because the clerk himself would have been assaulted by the then sitting chiefs in the
attempt to have it read openly to them as he was instructed.”
This is not to imply that regulation of effort when palm trees were harvested commu-
nally was costless. Where the rules were clear, however, monitoring need only detect
that a violation had occurred, not on whose land, and could be effected by any member
of the village. Whereas defense of private property was a largely private act, maintaining
the rules of communal harvesting was in the interest of the whole community. This is
the critical distinction between the costs of monitoring under private and communal
property in the model; while under private property the costs of monitoring rise with
the price of oil, they do not rise as quickly under communal harvesting.
26Abadist 9/1/26: Umuma Native Court Civil Suit 35/29
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Where difficulties arose with communal harvesting was when the law itself was am-
biguous. In NU 42/35, the plaintiff claimed that his people and those of the defendant
had decided to harvest separately, and that the matter had been related to the defen-
dants’ elder Ehuwa at the okonko (secret society) meeting. The defendants denied this,
and their spokesman told the court that “from the beginning of the creation, we cut
palm fruits, brushing roads and do every thing together.” The case had to be resolved
with the swearing of juju. Similarly, the palms under dispute in UNC 49/35 were owned
in common by four towns, while both privately and commonly owned trees coexisted.
Twelve years before, the elders of Umuala had made regulations concerning the use of
these trees and killed a goat to mark the occasion, but the meat had been refused by the
defendants’ elders, who did not inform their youth of what had occurred. The youth,
then, had no means of knowing what the rules were. The defendant in another case
pleaded to the court that “we have no common day for general palm nut cutting. This
law had not been instituted in our place” (OVW 35/37).
Collective action is made easier when the users of a natural resource are similar to
each other. In cases where several quarters attempted to enact communal harvest-
ing together or where other social conflicts intervened, co-operation would at times
break down. Because of offenses against cutting regulations, Umueteghbe decided to
no longer cut together, each onumara (quarter) keeping to its own land (NU 243/35).
The defendant in NU 192/27 similarly told the court that his village had cut commu-
nally in the past, but a year ago, after a dispute where “Emereole had wanted to kill
Nwaeke,” the amala (village council) had “decided that we should cut palm nuts from
each compound’s bush.” The representative of the amala (village council), however,
told a different story, informing the court that “[w]e said as it is the tax payment season
that no one should cut palm nuts again... We got a writer and a book and put the law in
writing.”
4.4. Communal harvesting and effort costs. The model above abstracts away from the
methods used to regulate harvesting. Those communities that practiced imachi nkwu
attempted to maintain strict controls over when and how their members could cut.
While reaping palm fruit did not cause permanent damage to the trees, the village stock
of palms was like a fishery insofar as the gathering of fruits by some individuals could
leave others without the means to pay tax when it came due. Where there were restric-
tions, specific days were set aside at regular intervals during which individuals could cut
palm fruits at will. The beginning of the communal harvest was signalled by the beating
of a drum, and cutting when it had not been rung was punishable by a fine.
Within these outlines, regulations differed by village. In NU 284/37, it was stated that
the grown men had been divided into two groups, each with separate turns. Some vil-
lages ceased completely to recognize private rights over trees while others did not – the
defendant in one suit listed for the court some individuals who used to have private
rights but stated that “since 12 years we have deprived them of their Okpulor [private]
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palm trees” (MGC 161/36). Consistent with the interpretation that these restrictions
were imposed to reduce the negative externalities of harvest effort, some villages per-
mitted cutting to be suspended if one of its residents was under arrest or away at court
(ANO 281/38).
Whether individuals could hire helpers or sell their own turns varied. Mayne noted
that among the northern Ohuhu of the Umuahia NCA, those individuals who could
hire the greatest number of laborers from neighboring towns collected the most fruit
(Abadist 8/11/12). In the village of Umuoke-nnunu, people were permitted to sell their
turns, as was revealed when one of the defendants of ANO 308/42 was charged with sell-
ing his turn to each of the three other defendants at once. The defendant in NU 82/35
claimed that hiring of up to three reapers was permitted at Umuejea; while the plaintiff
disputed this assertion, he took action against the defendant, and not against the man
to whom the defendant had sold his turn (and who had sold his harvest to the plaintiff’s
wife). At Ndiegora, a stranger living in the town was brought to court because, on the
orders of his host, he “joins us in palm cuttings and he has been severally warned to go
to his town to join” (ANO 109/41). Similarly, at Umumkpakara Mkpuru it was said that
a person who “cut palm nuts by two persons” was made to pay a fine. The defendant
in a subsequent case from the same village claimed that he had hired a man to cut nuts
for his brother who was away at school, but the plaintiffs protested that he should have
called a boy to cut, as “an adult can not be called to cut palm nuts for a young boy” (ANO
167/43).
5. DIRECT TAXATION
Green (1941) suggests that direct taxation under colonial rule intensified the conflict
between elders and youth over palm harvesting, leading to communal harvesting in
places where it had not already existed. Taxes also help explain why low interwar prices
of palm oil did not lead communal harvesting to be abandoned. Suppose, in the model,
that the youth has to pay τ in taxes, regardless of the cost, so that under private prop-
erty he faces the constraint sp ≥ τ . If the private equilibrium gives him this, nothing
changes. If not, he will steal exactly enough to pay the tax, and so monitoring over and
above what is needed to keep him to this amount of stealing is ineffective. The elder will
then reduce his monitoring to this amount, (p− τ)2/p. Reducing monitoring in order to
let the youth steal is, like communal harvesting, another mechanism by which the elder
chooses to self-interestedly cede his property rights. In the remainder of this section, I
check this prediction against evidence from the court records.
Poll taxes were introduced in Igboland in 1928, in order to bolster the power of the
Warrant Chiefs through the creation of Native Treasuries.27 The heart of disputes over
palms was that they were a valuable source of cash income that could be used to pay
27Both Afigbo (1966, p. 550) and Gailey (1970, p. 76) cite this as the prime concern that motivated the ex-
tension of taxation to the Eastern Provinces. Ikime (1966, p. 559) also notes that British officials felt it was
inequitable that the East should remain immune from direct taxes, when these were already in existence
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tax. Usoro (1974, p. 60) makes a rough estimation28 that 20% of the palm oil exported
in 1931 was collected as tax. At the time taxes were introduced, the value of the tax was
roughly equivalent to one four-gallon tin of oil, though this physical burden doubled
within a year due to falling prices (Martin, 1988, p. 113-117). Where palm oil was har-
vested privately, the receipts were put to uses for which cash was similarly necessary;
the defendant in one case told the court that he had harvested palms to pay his younger
brother’s school fees (ANO 167/43). In another suit, one party had pledged an okpulor
ika (private grove) belonging to the ofo-holder on behalf of the onumara (quarter) in
order to pay the collective fine levied after the Women Riot (OVU 461/36).
It was difficult for youth to pay their taxes by means other than palm harvesting. Allen
wrote that palm produce was the only means of obtaining cash with which to pay tax
or purchase imports. There is little indication in either the literature or archival sources
how individuals that did not have access to palm produce or paid employment were able
to meet their tax obligations. Afigbo (1966, p. 551) writes that, when taxation proposals
were discussed with the Igbo, district officers were asked if they would prosecute people
who pawned their children to pay the tax. It is clear that men did pawn themselves to
pay tax (Afigbo, 1966, p. 553), and that women sometimes had to use their savings to
pay their husbands’ tax the first year it was collected (Gailey, 1970, p. 98).
Even where there was no conversion from private to communal property, the intro-
duction of direct taxation raised the incentives for youth without groves of their own to
steal from others. In a 1939 case, the defendant admitted that the plaintiff owned the
trees from which he had harvested and accepted his contention that “the palm trees
known as Okpulo [private] palm belong to the elderly man of the family. And that it is
not lawful for any other person cut it.” Even still, he had reaped from these trees because
he had no other means of paying the tax (UNC 17/39).
Supporting the predictions of the model, in several cases the communal controls im-
posed on palm cutting are stated directly by witnesses to have been linked to the pay-
ment of tax. In UNC 62/35, the witness Waeke stated that the palms had been reserved
for paying tax. In another suit, the plaintiff argued that, four weeks previously, a rule
had been made that no-one was to cut palm fruits until notice was given, so that the
fruits could ripen and yield enough oil for the payment of tax. This rule had, however,
become unenforceable, and when an attempt was made to renew it a goat was sacrificed
to solemnize the decision (OVU 418/35).
in the North and West. While in other parts of British Africa, poll taxes were introduced as a means to in-
crease the labor supply (Arrighi, 1970; Perrings, 1979), there is no indication this was a deciding factor in
the Igbo case. Direct taxes were not a major source of revenue; rather, the British fiscal interest in palm oil
was in export duties, which had been imposed in 1916. Customs and excise duties formed 46% of the gov-
ernment’s revenue from 1922-27, and excise taxes on palm oil averaged 7% of the value exported (Martin,
1988, p. 112). Produce inspection fees of 9d per ton of kernels and 1s per ton of oil were introduced in the
Eastern Provinces in 1928 (Martin, 1988, p. 58).
28 0.25 adult males per person X 2,563,148 taxable population in the palm oil belt X 7/6 tax per adult male
£10.28 per ton estimated producer price X 118,133 tons exported = 19.9%
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The difficulty of enforcing regulations made when palms were made communal for
tax payment is a persistent theme of the court records. This is a complication not di-
rectly captured by the model. The defendant in OVO 440/36 told the court that “since
the tax payment the palm nuts had been set free for anyone to cut to pay tax,” but be-
cause of violations, the rule had become ignored. In some instances intermediate so-
lutions between communal and private property were attempted. One compound in
the Ovuku Group Court Area had given three consecutive turns to the young men to cut
from “both private palm and communal palm,” though the law had been “spoilt” by per-
sistent violation (OVU 66/36). In UNC 35/39, it was stated that “the villagers” had asked
all persons to whom palm groves had been pledged “to come and cut their palm fruits
and leave it to ripe again for Amalas [village council] for general use.” The defendant in
the suit objected to this, telling the court that he had not agreed to give the plaintiff “my
palm fruits to cut and pay their tax.” The court found in his favor.
Several complexities of the interaction between direct taxation, property, and institu-
tional change are highlighted by the two cases of UNC 89/38 and OVO 344/36. In the
first case, the plaintiff had ceased to allow the young men to harvest fruit from his trees
after he did not receive his share of the 10% rebate of tax revenues paid by the colonial
government as compensation for assistance in tax-collection. By his own estimation,
this would have been 15s. The defendants were then compelled to borrow money to
pay their taxes. When their creditors troubled them, they gathered oil from the fruits on
his land. The plaintiff protested:
I told them that my father never told me that one could take one’s palm
trees by force, and that we use to appear in open square and pass a rule
that the owners of the palm trees should allow young men to cut nuts for
tax.
The witness Akarawolu told the court that Kelly, the British officer, had told instructed
the young men to meet with the elders “in discussing of anything,” but had also told the
old men to have “one ‘Okpulo Ika’ [private grove] and one only.” The court found for
the plaintiff, deciding that he should not be forced to surrender his palms and was free
to “carry on with his palm trees and do what he pleases.”
In the second case, the elders of Umuakole had initially responded to the poll taxes
by arranging for a time during which young men could cut from private groves. In the
past year, the arrangement had collapsed, and palms were being cut in common with
no restrictions on the time of harvest. A meeting was summonsed and juju adminis-
tered that no one should cut except on appointed days. The defendants in the case had
not adhered to this decision and forced their way into the plaintiff’s land. A tax demand
note was then received stating that 24 days remained until payment was due. The first
defendant told the court that a meeting was then held and cutting suspended “as pay-
ment of tax has come into force.” The defendants, however, were annoyed that, of the
eleven persons in Umuakole with private palm groves, they believed only three were
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entitled to them. Further, the plaintiff and others had “exceeded more than what their
ancestors had.” The court initially found for the plaintiff, but on review the defendants
were cautioned and discharged. The reviewing officer noted that the “elders take this
case much to heart. They say unless the defts are punished, the young men will get out
of control. Nonetheless, fiat justia ruat coelum, usurpation of okpulos [private groves]
is at the root of the trouble.”
In both these cases, the youth admitted that the palm groves in question were the
property of the elders, but were not willing to allow rights of ownership to interfere with
their ability to pay tax. While colonial officials tried to uphold the authority of the elders,
they also limited their accumulation of property when it interfered with revenue collec-
tion and village peace. The aims of Indirect Rule and the means of funding it pulled the
men on the spot in opposite directions. Phillips (1989) has described British colonialism
in West Africa as a “makeshift settlement.” The initial ambition of importing capitalism
came up against the realities of labor costs, land tenure systems, and the need to placate
traditional authorities in order to maintain law and order. While she focuses on the con-
flicting aims that faced individual governors, it is clear these same contradictions also
forced local administrators into a balancing act.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have described the political economy of property rights as part of a
micro-level study of institutional change. Certain Igbo groups responded to the rising
commercial value of palm produce by curtailing private rights over palm trees. I have
presented a model in which this outcome is in the interests of both those with trees
and those without. Because defense of property rights is costly, a regulated scheme of
communal harvesting may be preferable to the private-defense equilibrium, and a rise
in the price of output can make such an arrangement sustainable. I have used model
along with colonial court records to explain the political economy of disputes over palm
trees that occurred in Igbo communities during the first half of the twentieth century.
These were understandable as conflicts between the economic and political interests of
elders with property and a tenuous grasp on village authority with youth, who had little
property, the burden of bride-payments, and aspirations to political power.
I have added to our understanding of common property, collective action, and the
impact of trade on the commons. For the Igbo, common property existed because it
helped reduce the costs of defending private property that had intensified as palm oil
became commercialized. It provided a mechanism by which those who did not own
trees of their own were still enabled to pay tax. The collective action needed for the op-
eration of this scheme was facilitated by the relative ease of detecting violations, by the
small size of Igbo communities, and by the fact that it could be enacted within an ex-
isting institutional arrangement. It was hindered by the diffuseness of authority in Igbo
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society, by cases where the rules governing harvesting were not clear, and by the addi-
tional complications created by the Native Courts as a competing jurisdiction. These
points echo the general findings of Ostrom (1991). Trade did not undermine common
property or collective action in the Igbo case, but instead strengthened them.
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